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The problem with movements and parties spearheaded by “populist” leaders such as
Putin, Erdoğan, Orbán, Kaczyński or Trump is not that they happen to embrace more
nationally focused policies that metropolitan elites widely condemn as unjust,
ineffective or otherwise misguided. Nor is the problem that they embrace a
confrontational political style and uncouth rhetoric at odds with the mores of
reflexively enlightened society in political capitals across liberal constitutional
democracies. Neither of those features would constitute a constitutional threat
justifying sustained reflections on constitutional resilience. The problem with electoral
successes of populist authoritarian nationalists is that they pose a fundamental threat
to liberal constitutional democracy.
The nature of that threat may on occasion be obscured by the rhetorical embrace of
democracy by populist authoritarian nationalists. When the human rights of critical
journalists are violated, when the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and
the separation of powers are threatened, when representatives of international civil
society and NGO´s are described as foreign meddlers and the European Union and
international institutions are fundamentally discredited as illegitimate, such positions
are defended in the name of democracy. All populist authoritarian nationalists claim to
be good democrats and discredit their opponents as undemocratic. In current debates
democracy has become a term that is being used as a bludgeon against liberal
constitutional democracy to help bring about the transition towards a new order. That
new order, which is described as “illiberal”, “guided” or “sovereign” democracy is
conceived as opposed to and an alternative to liberal constitutional democracy.
It would be too quick to simply dismiss this appropriation of democracy as an
intellectually bankrupt exercise of politically motivated rhetorical obfuscation. Claims,
that democracy and the institutions of the modern constitutional state are not
necessary complements but stand in tension to one another and are based on
different presuppositions, have a pedigree among modern constitutional theorists that
goes back at least to Carl Schmitt’s Rousseau inspired theory of democracy and
remains alive and well even among some mainstream constitutional theorists today.[1]
At the heart of such a conception of democracy is the idea of a unified will of the
people as the foundation of all political legitimacy. The idea of a unified political will as
the foundation of all political legitimacy explains four problematic anti-constitutionalist
features of national-authoritarian ideologies.
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First, populists have problems with the idea of legitimate opposition. They are, as Jan-
Werner Müller has described elaborately[2], anti-pluralist. Populists claim to represent
the whole of the people. Those against them must either be corrupt, incompetent or
treasonous – in the service of cosmopolitan capital interests or foreign powers – or do
not belong to the authentic people.  The idea of legitimate opposition, on the other
hand, is central to liberal constitutional democracy. No genuine democracy without
legitimate opposition. Free and equals practicing collective self-determination should
be able to agree on basic constitutional principles. Beyond that the minority defeated
in the democratic process is not expected to give up its own convictions about what
justice and good policy require. They are not required to accept the majority decision
to have been the correct one. The continued existence of a plurality of competing
opinions and parties is not seen as a symptom of crisis or decay, or a modus vivendi to
tolerate for so long as more oppressive uniformity enforcing measures remain
counterproductive or otherwise unfeasible. Minority dissent is an ordinary state of
affairs in an open society in which the freedom of speech among free and equals is
secured. The minority is under a duty to accept the majority decision as legally binding,
but retains the right to politically fight for a different policy, including the replacement
of the current government with a different one, without having to fear repressions,
sanctions or otherwise being discriminated against.
Second, populists have problems with the idea of procedural legitimacy. Separation of
powers, formalities and legal procedures central to constitutional due process are
seen not as the means of deliberative will-formation and democratic will construction,
but as a Trojan horse for well-organized political elites to sabotage and subvert the
authentic democratic will. In the political imagination of populists there is nothing
between the people and their representatives, and it´s not unusual to claim that the
people and its leadership are identical. Donald Trump, for example, claimed on
occasion of his inauguration that with his election not another party would rule in
Washington, but the people themselves. The formalities of democratic procedures,
separation of powers, the independence of the press, the impartiality and
independence of the courts, all these are potential obstacles to effectively implement
the authentic will of the people, if these institutions can’t be made into effective tools
for implementing and creating further resonance for the authentic will of the people as
determined by the leadership. In this way the relationship between populists and
institutions is purely opportunistic: Whatever helps to secure the effective
implementation of the people´s will is legitimate, whatever is an obstacle to it is
illegitimate. In practice, however, referenda, under conditions where the public media
and the security apparatus is firmly in the hand of the dominant party, may be a
reliable procedure of choice. Elections, too, can generally be relied on to produce the
right results under the right kind of conditions and need not be formally abolished. But
informal acclamation, too, is proof of legitimacy. It is not surprising that Trump
(erroneously) insists that there were more people present at his inauguration than at
any other previous inauguration. But generally, legitimation does not occur by way of
procedure, instead the legitimacy of the procedure is assessed by the extent to which
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it can recognize and implement the authentic will of the people as determined by the
respective leader. An election proves itself to have been legitimate, rather than
corrupted and subjected to undue influence, if it results in victory for the populists.
Third, for populists any participation and influence of non-citizens or international
institutions is a problem. If the foundation of legitimacy is the will of the people, then it
is not a big step to discredit the influence of international institutions, international
law, or the voices of an international civil society as an unjustified interference by
external actors in the national democratic process. Yet the opposite is the case: Taking
into account interests and rights of outsiders in a procedurally and substantively
adequately structured way is a precondition for the legitimacy of national democratic
processes. The open constitutional state, embedded in an international legal
community and establishing a public sphere that integrates and reflects external
voices and concerns, is not in tension with genuine democracy, but establishes the
structures that assure its legitimacy.[3]
There remains a final point: If the will of the people is imagined as uniform, and
persistent dissent is problematic, then the focus shifts to the extra-political features
that assure the sufficient homogeneity of the people as a necessary precondition for
the possibility to achieve such a will. “The people” in such a conception are not simply,
as Kant put it, a multitude of persons under the jurisdiction of the state (einer Menge
von Menschen unter Rechtsgesetzen). The regulative ideal underlying citizenship is not
that everyone who happens to legally reside within the jurisdiction in the long term
should have it as a free and equal human being. Instead the focus shifts to the
existence of homogeneity-assuring criteria, however they may be specified. Many
minorities, defined by deviant religious, ethnic, racial or cultural norms will then be
excluded and deemed not to belong to the genuine people, the People with a capital P,
or “the Demos”. Yet the only precondition for the stability of liberal constitutional
democracy is a citizenry that is able to recognize and respect other citizens as free and
equal partners and the constitution as the legal framework structuring democratic
practices of collective self-determination.  More than the integration of immigrant
minorities that may in part not share such an understanding, the integration of
national authoritarian populists who also lack such an understanding has become a
significant problem for constitutionalism.
Once populist authoritarian nationalists have taken over the government, as they have
in Russia, Turkey, Hungary and Poland, the question arises how, if at all, liberal
constitutional democracy can survive. The question of constitutional resilience is best
posed before that happens: How should a constitution be designed, what kind of
institutional and legal choices are the most promising to help keep the channels of
political change genuinely open and a system of fair political competition functioning
even under an authoritarian government? One of the advantages of our darkening
times is that this is a question we can ask drawing profitably on the experiences made
elsewhere, in Europe and beyond.
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